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                    PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 18-3550 
   
 
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 
an unincorporated association; NATIONAL BASKETBALL 
ASSOCIATION, a joint venture; NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE, an unincorporated association; NATIONAL 
HOCKEY LEAGUE, an unincorporated association; OFFICE 
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, an 
unincorporated association doing business as MAJOR 
LEAGUE BASEBALL 
 
v. 
 
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; DAVID 
L. REBUCK, Director of the New Jersey Division of Gaming 
Enforcement and Assistant Attorney General of the  
State of New Jersey; *JUDITH A. NASON, Acting Executive 
Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission; NEW 
JERSEY THOROUGHBRED HORSEMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION, INC.; NEW JERSEY SPORTS & 
EXPOSITION AUTHORITY STEPHEN M. SWEENEY, 
President of the New Jersey Senate; *CRAIG J. COUGHLIN, 
Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly 
 
                                                 (Intervenors in District Court) 
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       New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association, Inc., 
                                                        Appellant 
 
          *(Amended pursuant to Clerk's Order dated 12/27/18) 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  3-14-cv-06450) 
District Court Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
       
 
Argued on July 2, 2019 
 
 Before:  McKEE, PORTER and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed September 24, 2019)       
                                                     
Anthony J. Dreyer 
Jeffrey A Mishkin (Argued) 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom 
4 Times Square 
New York, NY  10036 
 
Richard Hernandez 
William J . O’Shaughnessy 
McCarter & English 
100 Mulberry Street 
Four Gateway Center, 14th Floor 
Newark, NJ  07102 
 
    Counsel for Appellees 
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Eliott M. Berman 
McElroy Deutsch Mulvaney & Carpenter 
570 Broad Street 
Suite 1500 
Newark, NJ   07102 
 
Ronald J. Riccio (Argued) 
McElroy Deutsch Mulvaney & Carpenter 
1300 Mount Kemble Avenue 
P. O. box 2075 
Morristown, NJ   07962 
 
    Counsel for Appellants 
 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Temporary restraining orders are not always a sure bet.  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) requires the party 
seeking a TRO to “give[] security in an amount that the court 
considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any 
party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”  
In this case, Appellees moved for, and the District Court 
entered, a TRO that, among other things, barred the New Jersey 
Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association (“NJTHA”) from 
conducting sports gambling on the basis that New Jersey’s 
“authorization” of sports gambling violated the federal 
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Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), 
and required Appellees to post a bond as security.  On appeal, 
NJTHA and the other defendants successfully challenged the 
constitutionality of PASPA in the Supreme Court, and, on 
remand, NJTHA sought to recover on the bond that Appellees 
had posted.  The District Court denied the motion for judgment 
on the bond.  Because we conclude that NJTHA was 
“wrongfully enjoined” within the meaning of Rule 65(c) and 
no good cause existed to deny bond damages in this case, we 
will vacate and remand. 
 
I. 
 Although this appeal concerns NJTHA’s ability to 
recover on the bond, that is only the last shoe to drop in a 
lengthy saga that involves other overarching issues, including 
the constitutionality of PASPA, its interaction with New 
Jersey’s attempts to legalize sports gambling, and the several 
opinions of the District Court, this Court, and the Supreme 
Court in the two actions litigating these issues among the same 
parties.  Thus, a thorough review of the unique procedural 
history underlying this dispute is warranted. 
 
A. 
 In 1992, Congress enacted PASPA, making it 
“unlawful” for “a government entity” or a person acting at the 
direction of a government entity “to sponsor, operate, 
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . 
. a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or 
wagering scheme based . . . on” competitive sporting events.  
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (emphasis added).  At that time and for the 
following nineteen years, New Jersey law paralleled PASPA, 
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prohibiting sports gambling by its Constitution and by statute.  
See, e.g., N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, para. 2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:37–2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:40–1.  However, in 2011, New 
Jersey constituents voted to amend the state’s Constitution to 
allow the legislature to authorize sports gambling, N.J. Const. 
art. IV, § 7, para. 2(D), (F), and the legislature did so by 
enacting the Sports Wagering Act in 2012 (the “2012 Act”), 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A–1 et seq. 
 The National Collegiate Athletic Association and four 
professional sports leagues1 (collectively, “Appellees” or “the 
Leagues”), initiated an action in federal court (“Christie I”) 
against the New Jersey Governor and other state officials 
(collectively, the “State Defendants”), seeking to enjoin the 
2012 Act as violative of PASPA and arguing that they would 
be irreparably injured unless an injunction was issued.  
Because it intended to offer sports gambling at Monmouth Park 
racetrack, NJTHA intervened.2  The defendants did not dispute 
that the 2012 Act violated PASPA and instead argued, among 
other things, that PASPA unconstitutionally commandeered 
the states’ sovereign authority.  The District Court disagreed, 
held that PASPA was constitutional, and enjoined the 
implementation of the 2012 Act.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 573, 578–79 (D.N.J. 
2013).  We affirmed, reasoning that PASPA does not 
affirmatively command the states to act and consequently did 
                                              
1 The professional sports leagues are the National Basketball 
Association; the National Football League; the National 
Hockey League; and the Office of the Commissioner of 
Baseball, doing business as Major League Baseball. 
2 Stephen M. Sweeney, President of the New Jersey Senate, 
and Sheila Y. Oliver, then Speaker of the New Jersey General 
Assembly, also intervened.   
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not prohibit them from repealing any existing bans on sports 
wagering.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 
F.3d 208, 231–32 (2013).  The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.  Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 537 U.S. 
931 (2014). 
 
B. 
 In response to our reasoning that PASPA does not 
prohibit states from repealing any existing bans on sports 
gambling, the New Jersey legislature enacted a law repealing 
certain state law provisions that prohibited gambling at 
horserace tracks and casinos (the “2014 Act”).  See 2014 N.J. 
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 62 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-
7 to -9 (repealed 2018)).  NJTHA immediately announced its 
intention to conduct sports gambling at Monmouth Park.  
Appellees filed the instant suit (“Christie II”) and, at the outset, 
requested a TRO and preliminary injunction to enjoin NJTHA 
from doing so, again asserting irreparable injury.  Appellees 
also asked the District Court to restrain the State Defendants 
from implementing the 2014 Act and to enforce the injunction 
entered in Christie I.  They filed their request on both the 
Christie I and Christie II dockets.   
 
 In response, the defendants relied on our reasoning in 
Christie I that the federal law allowed a repeal of state sports 
gambling prohibitions.  The State Defendants specifically 
asserted that a grant of Appellees’ request would again raise 
the issue of PASPA’s constitutionality.  See A. 240–41 
(“[E]ither PASPA permits States to repeal their prohibitions 
against sports wagering in whole or in part, as does the 2014 
Act, or PASPA unconstitutionally commandeers states[’] 
authority by forcing States to maintain unwanted 
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prohibitions.”).  Additionally, NJTHA argued, among other 
things, that the Leagues’ assertion that sports gambling would 
harm them was false, since they “support, participate in, and 
significantly profit from betting on the outcomes of their games 
as well as the performances of the players in their games.”  Br. 
in Opp’n to Pls.’ Appl. for a TRO at 35, Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:14-cv-06450 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 
2014), ECF No. 21.  NJTHA also complained that the Leagues 
had not posted a bond, as required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65, and attached a certification asserting that they 
would lose $1,170,219 per week if a TRO was granted.3   
 
 The District Court granted the requested TRO and, in 
doing so, relied on our holding in Christie I that PASPA is 
constitutional.  The Court ordered Appellees to post a $1.7 
million bond, which it believed was “on the high side to avoid 
any potential loss to defendants.”  A. 64.  Shortly thereafter, it 
extended the TRO for an additional two weeks and increased 
the bond amount to a total of $3.4 million.   
 
 Just before the TRO was set to expire, the District Court 
converted the scheduled hearing on the Leagues’ request for a 
preliminary injunction into a final summary judgment hearing.  
The Court granted summary judgment to Appellees, holding 
that the 2014 Act was “invalid as preempted by PASPA.”  Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 506 
(D.N.J. 2014).  It also entered a permanent injunction against 
the State Defendants, enjoining them “from violating PASPA 
                                              
3 Appellees did not contest this amount and instead argued 
that they should not be required to put up a bond.   
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through giving operation or effect to the 2014 [Act] in its 
entirety.”4  Id. 
 
 On appeal, this Court first affirmed the District Court’s 
order.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New 
Jersey, 799 F.3d 259, 261 (3d Cir. 2015).  We then granted 
NJTHA’s petition for rehearing en banc and again affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 
2016) (en banc).  In doing so, we determined that the 2014 Act, 
like its predecessor, “authorize[d]” sports gambling in 
violation of PASPA.  Id. at 396.  We explicitly rejected our 
reasoning in Christie I that a repeal is not an “affirmative 
authorization.”  Id. at 396–97.  Instead, we looked to “what the 
provision actually does” and held that, “[w]hile artfully 
couched in terms of a repealer, the 2014 [Act] essentially 
provides that, notwithstanding any other prohibition by law, 
casinos and racetracks shall hereafter be permitted to have 
sports gambling,” which “is an authorization.”  Id. at 397.  We 
then went on to again reiterate PASPA’s constitutionality.  Id. 
at 399. 
 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed our 
en banc judgment.  See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485 (2018).  Although the Court 
agreed with one aspect of our ruling, namely, that a repeal of a 
law banning an activity constitutes an “authoriz[ation]” of that 
activity, id. at 1474, the Court concluded that PASPA’s 
prohibition of sports gambling violated the Constitution’s 
anticommandeering principle because “state legislatures are 
[still] put under the direct control of Congress,” id. at 1478. 
                                              
4 The District Court did not permanently enjoin NJTHA.   
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C. 
 After prevailing in the Supreme Court, NJTHA filed a 
motion in the District Court for judgment on the bond.5  The 
Court ordered briefing on whether NJTHA was “wrongfully 
enjoined,” whether NJTHA was entitled to recover the full 
bond amount as a matter of law without proving actual loss, 
and whether NJTHA’s claim for damages greater than the bond 
amount could be decided as a matter of law.  There was no 
discovery on the actual loss amount. 
 
 The District Court denied NJTHA’s motion.  First, it 
determined that NJTHA was not “wrongfully enjoined” per 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c).  The Court thought that 
“NJTHA’s contention that it is entitled to damages under the 
injunction bond conflate[d] the issue of whether the 2014 [Act] 
authorized sports betting with the Supreme Court’s ultimate 
holding that PASPA is unconstitutional.”  A. 18.  The District 
Court narrowly characterized the issue before it at the TRO 
stage as “whether the 2014 [Act] . . . effectively authorized 
sports betting in violation of PASPA” and noted that both the 
Third Circuit and the Supreme Court agreed with its conclusion 
that the 2014 Act did so.  A. 16 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Court stated, “That PASPA’s 
constitutionality was introduced on appeal does not convert the 
bond, which assured that the 2014 [Act] amounted to an 
                                              
5 NJTHA also sought interest and damages for the post-TRO 
period (from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
through the Supreme Court’s judgment), the latter of which 
was for Appellees’ “bad faith by wrongfully blocking the 
NJTHA from operating a sports betting venue.”  A. 355. 
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authorization, into a bond that assured any and all 
possibilities.”  A. 19. 
 
 The District Court also held that, even if NJTHA had 
been wrongfully enjoined, good cause existed to deny 
NJTHA’s motion.  In doing so, the Court relied on Coyne-
Delany Co. v. Capital Development Board, in which the 
Seventh Circuit held that “a prevailing defendant is entitled to 
damages on the injunction bond unless there is a good reason 
for not requiring the plaintiff to pay in the particular case” and 
listed factors to be considered in determining whether good 
reason exists.  717 F.2d 385, 391–392 (7th Cir. 1983).  The 
District Court considered one factor that had been relied upon 
by the Court in Coyne, namely, a change in the law.  The 
District Court here reasoned that the law in this case had 
changed, characterizing PASPA as “constitutionally valid” in 
2014, when the TRO was entered, and invalid in 2018.  A. 20.  
NJTHA timely appealed the District Court’s order. 
 
 On appeal, NJTHA urges that the District Court was 
wrong on both counts.  Specifically, NJTHA argues that the 
Court erred in holding that it was not “wrongfully enjoined” 
because (1) entry of the TRO was premised on the 
constitutionality of PASPA, which the Supreme Court 
ultimately held was unconstitutional, and (2) the District Court 
incorrectly considered the law at the time it entered the TRO, 
as opposed to the law at the time of the Supreme Court’s final 
judgment, in making that determination.  NJTHA also urges 
that the District Court erred by exercising its discretion to deny 
bond damages and in concluding that there was good cause to 
do so.  On this front, NJTHA claims that discretion to deny 
bond damages under Rule 65(c) does not exist and the Seventh 
 11 
 
Circuit case relied upon by the District Court is not 
controlling.6   
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Because NJTHA challenges the District Court’s 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), we 
review the District Court’s order de novo.  Garza v. Citigroup, 
Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 280 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 
III. 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) states, in 
relevant part: 
 
The court may issue a preliminary 
injunction or a temporary 
restraining order only if the 
movant gives security in an 
amount that the court considers 
proper to pay the costs and 
damages sustained by any party 
found to have been wrongfully 
enjoined or restrained. 
                                              
6 NJTHA also argues that it is entitled to automatic recovery of 
the bond amount and excess damages for Appellees’ bad faith.  
Because these issues were not addressed by the District Court, 
we will not consider them. 
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The Rule itself only implies “that when a party has been 
wrongfully enjoined, it may collect some or all of the security.”  
Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 
20 (1st Cir. 2007).  It does not explicitly address when an 
enjoined party may recover on a bond, nor does it indicate 
whether and to what extent a district court has discretion to 
deny damages.  Although these issues have been considered by 
a number of other circuits, they are matters of first impression 
in our Court. 
 
A. 
  We first consider the meaning of “wrongfully 
enjoined” and whether NJTHA was wrongfully enjoined by the 
TRO issued in Christie II.  We join the other circuits that have 
explicitly interpreted this term and hold that a party is 
wrongfully enjoined when it turns out that that party had a right 
all along to do what it was enjoined from doing.  See Global 
Naps, 489 F.3d at 22 (“[A] party is wrongfully enjoined when 
it had a right all along to do what it was enjoined from doing.”); 
Slidell, Inc. v. Millennium Inorganic Chems., Inc., 460 F.3d 
1047, 1059 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[A] party has been wrongfully 
enjoined if it is ultimately found that the enjoined party had at 
all times the right to do what it was enjoined from doing.”); 
Nintendo of Am. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, 16 F.3d 1032, 1036 
(9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] party has been wrongfully enjoined 
within the meaning of Rule 65(c) when it turns out the party 
enjoined had the right all along to do what it was enjoined from 
doing.”); Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that a 
party has been wrongfully enjoined when the “party had at all 
times the right to do the enjoined act”). 
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 The parties disagree on the application of this standard 
to the case at hand.  NJTHA urges that, because the Supreme 
Court ultimately held that PASPA is unconstitutional, it 
“turned out” that it had a right all along to conduct sports 
gambling and was, therefore, “wrongfully enjoined.”  
Appellees disagree, claiming that we should consider both the 
state of the law and the specific issue before the District Court 
at the time the TRO was granted.  They argue that because “the 
constitutionality of PASPA was settled law in this Circuit” at 
the time the TRO was entered and because the District Court’s 
holding on the only issue before it at that time (i.e., that the 
2014 Act “authorized” sports gambling) was confirmed by this 
Court and the Supreme Court, NJTHA was not “wrongfully 
enjoined.”  Br. for Appellees at 20.  Appellees also urge that a 
determination that NJTHA was wrongfully restrained would 
require us to apply the Supreme Court’s holding retroactively.   
 
 Appellees’ arguments are flawed for three reasons.  
First, Appellees read the procedural history, as the District 
Court did, a bit too narrowly.  One might ask, if Christie II 
involved only the discrete issue of “authorization” and had 
nothing to do with the constitutionality of PASPA, how could 
the Supreme Court, in granting certiorari from Christie II (after 
having denied it from Christie I), address the issue of the 
constitutionality of PASPA and declare it unconstitutional?  
The answer is: because the constitutionality of PASPA was 
inexorably intertwined with the issues in Christie II.  Indeed, 
the State Defendants specifically urged that “either PASPA 
permits States to repeal their prohibitions against sports 
wagering in whole or in part, as does the 2014 Act, or PASPA 
unconstitutionally commandeers states[’] authority by forcing 
States to maintain unwanted prohibitions.” And we addressed 
the issue of PASPA’s constitutionality in Christie II in much 
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more than cursory fashion, although noting that it had been 
specifically ruled upon in Christie I.  Even though the case 
before the Supreme Court emanated from two discrete actions, 
the Supreme Court clearly considered the cases to be the 
proverbial “whole ball of wax.”  That the District Court parsed 
the issues based upon the limited nature of the subject matter it 
believed it addressed in the TRO order does not control the fact 
that the constitutionality of PASPA was imbedded in that 
subject matter by virtue of our opinion in Christie I.7 
                                              
7 Our disagreement with the dissent stems from the nature of 
the issues raised in the unusual procedural setting of the 
Christie cases, and our differing views as to how narrowly we 
parse what was before the District Court when it entered the 
TRO.   
 
Christie I was all about the constitutional implications 
of removing prohibitions, versus “affirmatively authorizing”; 
the latter constituting problematic commandeering.  In 
opposing the TRO, the State Defendants called on the 
“definitive” holding in Christie I, quoting from our opinion: 
“the lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activity does not 
mean it is affirmatively authorized by law.”  A. 239 (quoting 
Christie I, 730 F.3d at 232).  At the same time they maintained 
their fallback position noted above, that if the legislation 
“authorized,” then PASPA unconstitutionally commandeers.   
 
Thus, “authorizing” was not a discrete issue but, rather, 
one with weighty constitutional baggage.  The District Court 
in Christie II decided the issue of authorization within, as the 
District Court noted, the “framework” of Christie I and its 
commandeering analysis.  
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 Second, Appellees’ view conflates whether NJTHA was 
“wrongfully enjoined” with whether the District Court abused 
its discretion in issuing the TRO.  In Sprint Communications 
Co. v. CAT Communications International, Inc., we made clear 
that “wrongfully enjoined” “does not necessarily [mean] that 
the district court abused its discretion in granting the relief in 
the first place.”8  335 F.3d 235, 242 n.9 (quoting Blumenthal, 
910 F.2d at 1054) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original).  Instead, as noted above, whether a 
party is wrongfully enjoined depends upon whether it turns out 
that that party had a right all along to conduct the activity it 
was enjoined from doing.  The entire concept of “wrongfully 
enjoined” envisions a look back from the ultimate conclusion 
of the case:  Should the enjoined party have been permitted to 
do what it was prevented from doing?  Thus, whether a party 
was wrongfully enjoined depends upon the final judgment on 
the merits.  See id. (“[T]he ultimate determination whether a 
party was wrongfully enjoined and can recover on the 
injunction bond generally must wait until ‘after a trial and final 
judgment on the merits.’” (citation omitted)); see also Global 
Naps, 489 F.3d at 23 (stating that whether a party is 
“wrongfully enjoined” is determined by the final judgment). 
 Perhaps one could plausibly read Rule 65(c) as asking 
whether the District Court abused its discretion in granting the 
TRO.  But this would distort the plain meaning and purpose of 
the rule.  First, the rule allows defendants to collect on the bond 
if they are “found to have been wrongfully enjoined or 
restrained.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (emphasis added).  The use 
                                              
8 Indeed, in Nintendo, the Ninth Circuit had, in an earlier 
decision, upheld the district court’s issuance of the preliminary 
injunction but, later, ultimately determined that the defendant 
was wrongfully enjoined.  16 F.3d at 1036 n.4.   
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of a past tense verb phrase—found to have been—is important.  
See U.S. v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Congress’ use 
of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.”).  It 
suggests that we look back at the propriety of the injunction 
from the vantage point of the conclusion of the litigation, rather 
than stepping into the shoes of the District Court at the time the 
injunction was issued.  If “wrongfully enjoined” concerned 
only the propriety of the issuance of an injunction, then Rule 
65(c) would explicitly state a requirement that the injunction 
was improperly entered.  But to focus on whether a TRO was 
wrongfully issued misses the mark.  “Wrongfully enjoined” 
focuses on the right of an enjoined party to engage in certain 
conduct.9  For example, imagine that X asks a district court for 
a TRO against Y.  X urges that Y’s actions violate a federal 
law, Statute A.  The parties and the district court assume that 
Y’s actions violate the general terms of Statute A—their only 
focus is on whether Y’s conduct fits within a certain exception 
to Statute A, Exception B.  The court rules that Exception B 
does not apply to Y and issues the TRO.  But an appellate court, 
                                              
9 The dissent urges that the NJTHA was not wrongfully 
enjoined because the District Court properly issued the TRO 
under PASPA, four years before the Supreme Court held it 
unconstitutional.  But that is not the relevant question.  Rather, 
it is whether the defendant was wrongfully enjoined given what 
we know today. We agree with the dissent that the District 
Court “faithfully followed our precedent.”  Dissenting Op. at 
6.  But this is not incompatible with our holding.  The District 
Court can faithfully apply our precedent, and still, when the 
litigation has reached its conclusion, the defendant may be 
found to have been wrongfully enjoined.  Such is the case 
here.   
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much to X and Y’s surprise, finds that the district court’s 
discussion of Exception B is irrelevant because Y does not 
violate the general terms of Statute A.  Was Y wrongfully 
enjoined?  Yes.  While the district court’s reasoning may have 
been correct, i.e., that Y’s conduct does not fit within the terms 
of Exception B, and the court may have correctly interpreted 
the legal issue that was pressed by the parties, nevertheless, Y 
was still wrongfully enjoined, because it turned out that Y had 
a right to do all along what he was enjoined from doing. 
 
 Similarly, in Nintendo, the enjoined defendant 
introduced defenses at trial that it had not asserted at the 
preliminary injunction stage.  16 F.3d at 1034.  The defendant 
ultimately prevailed.  Id.  That the new defenses were not 
considered when the TRO was entered but may have affected 
the final outcome of the case did not preclude a holding that 
the defendant had been wrongfully enjoined.  See id. at 1037–
38.  Similarly, in this case, the fact that the District Court may 
not have erred in its ruling in entering the TRO in Christie II 
does not speak to whether NJTHA had a right all along to 
conduct sports gambling.10  Because a court can only be certain 
of an enjoined party’s rights after a case has been fully 
litigated, “wrongfully enjoined” can only be determined after 
a final judgment on the merits. 
 
                                              
10 Nor was the District Court “bound by this Court’s holding in 
Christie I” to enter the TRO and summary judgment for 
Appellees.  Br. for Appellees at 9.  The District Court might 
have, instead, seized upon our reasoning that a repeal would 
not be an authorization in violation of PASPA, as the State 
Defendants did in enacting the 2014 Act. 
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 In their final argument, Appellees assert that accepting 
NJTHA’s argument would require us to retroactively apply the 
Supreme Court’s holding that PASPA is unconstitutional.  
Indeed, in the mine-run of cases where a statute has been held 
to be unconstitutional, the issue of its retroactive application to 
invalidate previous final orders necessarily arises.  See Chicot 
Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 
(1940) (instructing that “[q]uestions of rights claimed to have 
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to 
have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in 
the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous 
application” be considered when determining whether a new 
rule applies retroactively).  But that body of caselaw, and 
indeed retroactivity itself, is not implicated when we are asked 
to determine whether a party was “wrongfully enjoined.”11  Did 
it turn out that NJTHA had the right all along to do what they 
were enjoined from doing?  There is no way that the answer to 
that question could be “no.”  That answer would render the 
bond provision, indeed the concept of “wrongfully enjoined,” 
entirely meaningless.  The lookback that is envisioned in the 
Rule is not an issue of retroactivity, or applying a ruling to 
undo or affect previous rulings; instead, it requires a simpler 
inquiry as to whether, if we knew then what we know now, 
should NJTHA have been restrained?  This does not require the 
court at the bond hearing to ask, as the dissent seems to urge, 
whether the TRO was wrongfully issued, or to nullify any 
                                              
11 The dissent seems to reason that there needed to be a court 
finding that the NJTHA had been wrongfully enjoined or 
restrained.  Again, that is not an issue to be decided later in the 
case, but instead, is what the court at the bond hearing must 
assess, after the case is fully concluded.  
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intervening action as invalid.  See, e.g., Dissenting Op. at 5 n.3.  
Here the “full deliberation” urged by the dissent came with the 
Supreme Court’s consideration of the case as a whole, and its 
declaration of PASPA’s unconstitutionality. Because the 
answer to that question is “no,” the answer to whether it was 
wrongfully restrained must be “yes.” 
 
 Here, PASPA provided the only basis for enjoining 
NJTHA from conducting sports gambling, and the Supreme 
Court ultimately held that that law is unconstitutional.  
Therefore, NJTHA had a right to conduct sports gambling all 
along.  We conclude that NJTHA was wrongfully enjoined and 
should be able to call on the bond. 
 
B. 
 We next evaluate whether and to what extent a district 
court has discretion to deny bond damages and whether doing 
so was proper in this case.  A clear majority of our sister 
circuits have held that there is a rebuttable presumption that a 
wrongfully enjoined party is entitled to recover provable 
damages up to the bond amount.   See Front Range Equine 
Rescue v. Vilsack, 844 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(“[W]here there is a finding that a defendant has been 
wrongfully enjoined, there is a presumption of recovery and 
the district court’s discretion to deny damages is limited.”); 
Nokia Corp. v. InterDigital, Inc., 645 F.3d 553, 558–59 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (“Although we hold that a wrongfully enjoined 
party is entitled to a presumption in favor of recovery, that 
party is not automatically entitled to the damages sought.  The 
presumption applies to ‘provable’ damages.”); Global Naps, 
489 F.3d at 23 (“[W]e adopt the majority rule that there is a 
rebuttable presumption that a wrongfully enjoined party is 
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entitled to have the security executed so as to recover provable 
damages up to the amount of the security.”); Nintendo, 16 F.3d 
at 1036 (“[W]e join what appears to be the majority and hold 
there is a rebuttable presumption that a wrongfully enjoined 
party is entitled to have the bond executed and recover 
provable damages up to the amount of the bond.”); Nat’l 
Kidney Patients Ass’n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1134 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993) (“[A] defendant 
injured by a wrongfully issued preliminary injunction is 
presumptively entitled to recovery on the injunction bond.”); 
Coyne, 717 F.2d at 391 (agreeing with the majority approach 
that “a prevailing defendant is entitled to damages on the 
injunction bond unless there is a good reason for not requiring 
the plaintiff to pay in the particular case”).  As noted by many 
of those courts, this rule is “strongly implied” in Rule 65(c) 
itself.  Nokia Corp., 645 F.3d at 558; see also Global Naps, 489 
F.3d at 20; Nat’l Kidney, 958 F.2d at 1135 (citing Coyne, 717 
F.2d at 390–91) (“Although the Rule does not explicitly 
address the disposition of the bond once the injunction is found 
wrongful, payment to the injured defendant seems almost 
inescapable, since the Rule imposes a requirement of security 
for the precise purpose of assuring compensation of the 
defendant . . . .”).  Moreover, the rule increases predictability 
of the law, see Coyne, 717 F.2d at 392, “discourag[es] parties 
from requesting injunctions based on tenuous legal grounds,” 
Nintendo, 16 F.3d at 1037, and conserves judicial resources, 
since “a defendant who can recover damages against a 
preliminary injunction bond will be less likely to file a separate 
malicious prosecution action,” id.  Because the presumption in 
favor of recovery is rebuttable, the rule still affords courts some 
discretion to “decline to impose damages on the rare party who 
has lost a case on the merits but nevertheless should not suffer 
the execution of the preliminary injunction bond.”  Id. 
 21 
 
 
 Appellees, however, urge us to adopt the approach 
espoused by the Fifth Circuit in H&R Block, Inc. v. McCaslin, 
which provides, “The awarding of damages pursuant to an 
injunction bond rests in the sound discretion of the court’s 
equity jurisdiction.”  541 F.2d 1098, 1099 (5th Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam).  But the Fifth Circuit stands alone on this issue,12 and 
                                              
12 Appellees cite to Page Communications Engineers, Inc. v. 
Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973), as additional 
authority for the minority approach.  However, the D.C. Circuit 
more recently interpreted Page as aligning with the majority 
approach: 
 
In Page we rejected a claim that 
Rule 65(c) automatically entitled 
defendants to recovery on the bond 
on a showing of damage, 
regardless of the equities of the 
case.  We clearly regarded those 
equities as leaning toward the 
plaintiff; although we spoke 
loosely of the plaintiff's “good 
faith”, arguably suggesting that 
that was enough to negate recovery 
on the bond, we also noted that the 
injunction might never have been 
granted if the government 
defendant had brought a specific 
study to the court’s attention in a 
timely fashion.  Accordingly, we 
do not read Page as adopting a 
maverick view but rather as in 
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the viability of that ruling has since been called into question 
by a more recent opinion.  See Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 
873 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that Rule 65(c)’s 
requirement of a bond “assures the enjoined party that it may 
readily collect damages from the funds posted or the surety 
provided in the event that it was wrongfully enjoined, without 
further litigation and without regard to the possible insolvency 
of the assured” (emphasis added) (citing Coyne, 717 F.2d at 
391)).  Because the majority approach is implied in the 
language of Rule 65(c) and promotes its goals, we now adopt 
that rule. 
 
 Although it relied on Coyne in its analysis on this issue, 
the District Court failed to apply the presumption in favor of 
recovery that the Court in Coyne applied.  Nor did the District 
Court note the main thrust of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning 
in that case, namely, that a district court is required to “consider 
and evaluate the full range of factors . . . that would be relevant 
under the proper standard.”  Coyne, 717 F.2d at 392.  These 
include, but are not limited to, a defendant’s failure to mitigate 
damages, Nokia Corp., 645 F.3d at 559, the reasonableness of 
the damages sought, id., the outcome of the underlying suit, 
Coyne, 717 F.2d at 392, and the parties’ resources, id.13  Only 
                                              
accord with the accepted 
presumption in favor of recovery. 
 
Nat’l Kidney, 958 F.2d at 1134 (citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993). 
13 Appellees claim that we should also consider their good faith 
in requesting the TRO.  However, this is not a factor properly 
considered in the good cause analysis because “[g]ood faith in 
the maintenance of litigation is . . . expected of all litigants” 
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after listing and discussing these factors did the Court in Coyne 
reference the factor relied upon by the District Court here to 
deny damages, namely, a change in the law.  See id. at 392.  
The Court there stated, “We do not believe that a change in the 
law is always a good ground for denying costs and injunction 
damages to a prevailing party, but it is a legitimate 
consideration, perhaps especially where the prevailing party is 
a state agency that benefited from a change in the law of its 
state.”  Id. at 392–93. 
 
 None of the factors cited in Coyne rebut the 
presumption that NJTHA is entitled to recover bond damages 
in this case.  Appellees have not claimed that NJTHA has failed 
to mitigate its damages or that the bond amount is 
unreasonable,14 and the underlying suit resulted in a judgment 
in NJTHA’s favor.  And, as to a change in the law, this case 
does not involve the type of “change in law” contemplated by 
Coyne.  There, the district court, in issuing the preliminary 
injunction, had relied on an intermediate state appellate court 
decision holding that an indirect bidder had a property right in 
being allowed to bid on a public contract.  See Coyne, 717 F.2d 
at 389.  While the suit was pending, the state Supreme Court 
                                              
and, otherwise, the presumption in favor of awarding bond 
damages would “congeal[] virtually into a rock.”  Nintendo, 16 
F.3d at 1037 (quoting Nat’l Kidney, 958 F.2d at 1135) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Coyne, 717 F.2d at 392 
(stating that good faith would be a sufficient reason to deny 
bond damages “only if the presumption were against rather 
than in favor of awarding costs and damages on the bond to the 
prevailing party”). 
14 In fact, the bond amount was set well below what NJTHA 
had requested. 
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reversed course and held that no such property right existed.  
See id.  Here, there was no change in the state of the law while 
the case was in the federal court.  Instead, the defendants in this 
case successfully challenged the constitutionality of PASPA on 
appeal, such that they ultimately prevailed.  That is not a 
change in the law; that is success on the merits.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that NJTHA is entitled to recover provable 
damages up to the bond amount. 
 
IV. 
 We will vacate the denial of NJTHA’s motion for 
judgment on the bond and damages, and remand for the District 
Court to determine the amount to be collected.15 
                                              
15 On remand, NJTHA will have the burden of showing 
provable damages.  Virginia Plastics Co. v. Biostim Inc., 820 
F.2d 76, 80 n.6 (3d Cir. 1987).  Although it is not required to 
prove an amount “to a mathematical certainty,” Global Naps, 
489 F.3d at 23–25, it must establish what damages were 
proximately caused by the erroneously issued injunction . . . 
and the alleged damages cannot be speculative,” Virginia 
Plastics Co., 820 F.2d at 80 n.6. 
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PORTER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 I disagree with the majority’s holding that the New 
Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association (“NJTHA”) 
was wrongfully enjoined for two reasons. First, the Supreme 
Court invalidated the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (“PASPA”) on constitutional grounds, but the 
temporary restraining order was not based on PASPA’s 
constitutionality. Instead, the District Court considered 
whether New Jersey law complied with PASPA itself. And 
even in striking down PASPA, the Supreme Court agreed with 
the District Court on that statutory question. Second, I disagree 
that the Supreme Court’s decision holding PASPA 
unconstitutional necessarily means that the NJTHA was 
wrongfully enjoined under the PASPA-based TRO issued four 
years earlier. This holding requires indulging the fiction—not 
available to the District Court that issued the TRO—that 
PASPA never existed at all. 
I 
There were two proceedings involving these parties. 
The first one, Christie I, involved a straight-on constitutional 
challenge. The second one, Christie II, presented a much 
narrower statutory question. The majority ably recites this 
procedural history, but the different issues involved in the two 
proceedings deserve highlighting. 
Christie I started when the major professional sports 
leagues (collectively, the “Leagues”) banded together to 
oppose a 2012 New Jersey law allowing sports betting at horse 
racetracks and casinos. The Leagues argued that the law 
violated PASPA. In response, the defendants directly 
challenged “PASPA’s constitutionality; specifically, whether 
it violated the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the 
Due Process Clause and related Equal Protection principles, or 
the Equal Footing Doctrine.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Christie, No. CV146450MASLHG, 2018 WL 6026816, at *1 
(D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2018). In early 2013, the district court denied 
the defendants’ constitutional challenge. 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 
579 (D.N.J.). It upheld PASPA and permanently enjoined New 
Jersey officials from enforcing the 2012 law. Id. We affirmed 
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d 
Cir. 2013); 573 U.S. 931 (2014). 
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 The second proceeding—Christie II—started in 2014, 
when New Jersey enacted a revised law to repeal restrictions 
on gambling. Soon after the 2014 law passed, the Leagues 
again sued, seeking to enjoin implementation of the 2014 law. 
The District Court granted the Leagues’ TRO request but 
required them to post a security bond under Rule 65(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The bond was originally set 
at $1.7 million, and after the TRO was extended another two 
weeks, was increased to $3.4 million.  
In November 2014—after the TRO had been in place 
for 28 days—the District Court granted summary judgment for 
the Leagues. 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D.N.J. 2014). Properly 
applying our Christie I decision, it held that the 2014 law 
authorized sports betting, which violated PASPA. Id. at 505. 
The District Court rejected the characterization of the 2014 law 
as a more limited, permissible successor: 
While styled as a partial repeal, the 2014 Law 
would have the same primary effect of the 2012 
Law—allowing sports wagering in New Jersey’s 
casinos and racetracks for individuals age 
twenty-one and over but not on college sporting 
events that take place in New Jersey or on New 
Jersey college teams. This necessarily results in 
sports wagering with the State’s imprimatur, 
which goes against the very goal of PASPA—to 
ban sports wagering pursuant to a state scheme. 
Id. 
Once again, the District Court’s decision was appealed, 
and once again, we affirmed in a panel decision. 799 F.3d 259 
(3d Cir. 2015). We re-heard the case en banc and once more 
affirmed the District Court. We explained that although the 
2014 law was “artfully couched in terms of a repealer,” it 
“essentially” legalized gambling. 832 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 
2016) (en banc). Under PASPA, “[t]his is an authorization.” 
Id.  
 The losing parties, including the NJTHA, again sought 
review from the Supreme Court. This time, they got it. In May 
2018, the Supreme Court held that PASPA unconstitutionally 
commandeered state legislatures, violating the Tenth 
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Amendment. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). But the Supreme Court agreed with the 
District Court (and this Court) on the issue litigated in Christie 
II: “[w]hen a State completely or partially repeals old laws 
banning sports gambling, it ‘authorize[s]’ that activity.” Id. at 
1474 (alteration original). 
In the wake of Murphy, the NJTHA asked the District 
Court to award it the $3.4 million bond. The NJTHA argued 
that the Supreme Court’s holding that PASPA was 
unconstitutional meant that the NJTHA was wrongfully 
enjoined for 28 days in late 2014. The District Court rejected 
this request and the NJTHA appealed. 
II 
Under Rule 65(c), a “court may issue a preliminary 
injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant 
gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to 
pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have 
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 
“The purpose of this provision is to enable a restrained or 
enjoined party to secure indemnification for any costs … and 
any damages that are sustained during the period in which a 
wrongfully issued equitable order remains in effect.” Charles 
A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 11A Federal Practice 
& Procedure: Civil, § 2954 (3d ed.). 
The majority opinion aligns our Court with others that 
have interpreted Rule 65(c) to “hold that a party is wrongfully 
enjoined when it turns out that that party had a right all along 
to do what it was enjoined from doing.” Maj. Op. 13 (collecting 
cases). I agree that this is the correct standard, but I disagree 
with its application here. In the sister circuit cases cited by the 
majority, the injunction and full merits proceedings addressed 
essentially the same issues. At the very least, none of these 
cases involve an appellate court expressly upholding the basis 
of the injunction while nonetheless deciding for the enjoined 
party on other grounds. So while these cases properly articulate 
the standard, their application of that standard offers little 
guidance in this situation. 
That is because here, no court at any point “found” the 
NJTHA “to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. 
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R. Civ. P. 65(c). Quite the contrary, in fact. As the procedural 
history shows, the District Court issued the TRO based on its 
conclusion that the 2014 law violated PASPA. Christie II, 61 
F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D.N.J. 2014). We affirmed, holding that 
the 2014 law violated PASPA by authorizing gambling. 
Christie II, 832 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). And 
the Supreme Court agreed that New Jersey’s repealer law was 
actually an authorization. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 
(2018).1 In sum, every court to have considered the issue of 
whether the 2014 law was actually an authorization—the very 
ground for the TRO—agreed with the District Court.2 
 Given the unanimity on this statutory point, the NJTHA 
must rely on a far-reaching view of retroactivity to support its 
claim that it was wrongfully enjoined. The majority purports to 
sidestep this point, asserting without any explanation that 
retroactivity is not implicated in this analysis at all. In its view, 
Rule 65 presents “a simpler inquiry” that asks “whether, if we 
knew then what we know now, should NJTHA have been 
restrained?” Maj. Op. 19. But that begs the question by simply 
assuming that the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision on the 
                                              
1 The majority correctly reads the Supreme Court’s decision to 
have “agreed with one aspect” of our decision—“namely, that 
a repeal of a law banning an activity constitutes an 
‘authoriz[ation]’ of that activity.” Maj. Op. 9. 
2 To be sure, the NJTHA’s failure to re-litigate PASPA’s 
constitutionality in Christie II was hardly improper. Our 
decision in Christie I made that constitutional issue res 
judicata. As the NJTHA acknowledges, any follow-on 
constitutional challenge would have “been an exercise in 
futility,” since a “lower court has no power to overrule the 
precedent of its judicial superior.” NJTHA Br. 28. 
In spite of that acknowledgment, the majority views 
Christie I’s constitutional question and Christie II’s statutory 
question as forming the same “ball of wax.” Maj. Op. 14. But 
the fact that the Supreme Court reached more broadly to decide 
the constitutional question does not mean that the statutory and 
constitutional questions were intertwined for purposes of the 
TRO. That TRO issue was much narrower. While the Supreme 
Court had wide discretion to review the commandeering 
question, on which it passed in Christie I, that issue was not 
before the District Court in Christie II. 
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commandeering issue means that PASPA never existed—in 
other words, the statute was void ab initio. That questionable 
assumption is the only way to explain the majority’s assertion 
that the NJTHA had the right “all along” to conduct sports 
gambling. Maj. Op. 13. But the Supreme Court has long 
cautioned against stretching this concept too far. See Chicot 
Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 
(1940) (“The actual existence of a statute, prior to [a 
determination of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and 
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The 
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.”).3 
The majority thus commits the “writ-of-erasure fallacy,” or the 
mistaken “assumption that a judicial pronouncement of 
unconstitutionality has canceled or blotted out a duly enacted 
statute” and rendered it a nullity. Jonathan F. Mitchell, The 
Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 933, 937 (2018). 
 Such an expansive view of retroactivity in this context 
is out of step with Rule 65’s function. The rule’s bond 
requirement “is rooted in the belief that a defendant deserves 
protection against a court order granted without the full 
deliberation a trial offers.” Am. Bible Soc. v. Blount, 446 F.2d 
588, 595 n.12 (3d Cir. 1971). In other words, the bond protects 
the enjoined party “if it turns out that the order issued was 
erroneous in the sense that it would not have been issued if 
there had been the opportunity for full deliberation.” Id. Here, 
of course, the District Court engaged in just that full 
deliberation following the TRO, satisfying Rule 65. 
 That full deliberation separates this case from the usual 
instances of a party being found to have been wrongfully 
enjoined. Typically, this finding occurs after the trial court’s 
                                              
3 See also United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539, 541 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (per curiam) (denying argument “premised on the theory 
that if an Act of Congress is unconstitutional, it is void ab 
initio, and any action taken pursuant to it is thus invalid,” 
noting that the Supreme Court “has rejected such a broad-
sweeping proposition”); cf. State of Kan. ex rel. Stephan v. 
Adams, 705 F.2d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 1983) (explaining that 
“the TRO was not dissolved because it was wrongfully issued, 
but rather because of an intervening event,” noting that it was 
“the intervention of Congress that brought about the change”). 
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merits adjudication following the temporary injunction.4 The 
finding may also be made by an appellate court reversing a 
temporary injunction. See Div. No. 1, Detroit, Bhd. of 
Locomotive Engineers v. Consol. Rail Corp., 844 F.2d 1218, 
1225 (6th Cir. 1988) (collecting cases). But the majority has 
not cited any case in which an appellate decision like 
Murphy—agreeing with the basis for the injunction while 
invalidating the law on other grounds—has supported a finding 
that a party was wrongfully enjoined. 
* * * * * 
In sum, I see little support for holding that a party was 
wrongfully enjoined when the District Court faithfully 
followed our precedent—as we and the Supreme Court 
acknowledged even as the Supreme Court invalidated the 
underlying law on different grounds. Had the District Court 
based the TRO on the constitutional question ultimately 
decided by the Supreme Court, I would view this matter 
differently. But that is not what happened here. And without an 
actual finding that a party was wrongfully enjoined, Rule 65 is 
not satisfied. Because the majority holds otherwise, I 
respectfully dissent. 
                                              
4 See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P. v. CAT Commc’ns Int’l, 
Inc., 335 F.3d 235, 242 n.9 (3d Cir. 2003) (“But the ultimate 
determination whether a party was wrongfully enjoined and 
can recover on the injunction bond generally must wait until 
‘after a trial and final judgment on the merits.’ (quoting Clark 
v. K–Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc)); 
U.S. D.I.D. Corp. v. Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 775 F.3d 
128, 139 (2d Cir. 2014) (“That a trial on the merits is usually 
required to determine whether the defendant was entitled to 
engage in the conduct that was enjoined is true irrespective of 
whether the defendant seeks recovery on security posted to 
secure a TRO or a preliminary injunction.”). 
